Life After Derrida: Anacoluthia and the Agrammaticality of Following
we could not not be haunted by the memory we still had of him. We could not not know that we were in some way being observed internally by him, by the spectral vigilance of his gaze, even if this quasi "presence" in no way limited our freedom. In truth, it even sharpened our responsibility. 1 Writing following the death of his friend Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida delineates (only) three possibilities 'in the time that relates us to texts and to their presumed, nameable, and authorized signatories': the first is that the author is already dead when we begin to read him, or when that reading orders us to write about him; the second, that the author is living at that same moment, in which case we might know them or not know them, meet them or not meet them, and -in possibly coming to meet them -love them or not love them; the last, that we might read those we knew, met and loved at their death and after their death, that is to say, (immediately) following their death. 2 This final possibility provokes Derrida's deepest anxiety. For he has written about authors long since dead, and -perhaps with most risk -about those remaining yet alive, but, he writes, what I thought impossible, indecent, and unjustifiable, what long ago and more or less secretly and resolutely I had promised myself never to do (out of concern for rigor or fidelity, if you will, and because it is in this case too serious), was to write following the death, not after, not long after the death by returning to it, but just following the death, upon or on the occasion of the death, at the commemorative gatherings and tributes, in the writings "in memory" of those who while living would have been my friends, still present enough that some "declaration," indeed some analysis or "study," would seem at that moment completely unbearable. (WM, (49) (50) It is no doubt a tribute to Derrida's immense personal capacity for friendship that he does not consider in this catalogue a fourth possibility -that of writing (immediately) following the death of an author we did not meet, did not know, and therefore who we could not, at least in person, have loved, yet whose texts and whose thoughts we have long been intimate with, have, indeed, long loved. How do we 'negotiate' -a word that, etymologically, evokes the disquiet or uneasiness inherent in such a procedure -this task? 3 Is it not, perhaps, even more impossible, even more indecent, even more unjustifiable -if not, in fact, plain improper -to presume to write, in some sense, 'in memory' of someone we did not know?
'Yet something I did wish to say.' 4 It is in this predicament that I am, at this very moment, writing (immediately) following the death of the man, Jacques Derrida. His death does not signify for me in the way that it does for those who knew him, who loved him, who enjoyed the gift of his friendship. In the face of their grief, I feel presumptuous to think that I might mourn
him. Yet, at the same time, I feel his loss. Not the loss of his person, for that I never knew, nor, strangely, the loss of his work, since there is so much I have still to read, since I know that Derrida's thought will live on in his writing -'life [mine and his?] was going to continue (there was still so much to read)' (WM, 37). I know that I will keep reading him, that I will continue to think through him, that his influence on my thought and those of others will not lessen due to the absence of the man behind the signature on a plethora of texts we have both read and have yet to read: 'Jacques Derrida'. But despite knowing all this, I feel bereft.
It is the desire to formulate my sense of loss in terms other than those of mourning -a desire driven by my equally strong sense of impropriety to be feeling such loss at all -that has led me back, on the event of Derrida's death, to the only text I ever heard him speak, to the one time I met, albeit briefly, Jacques Derrida, the man: 'Life regard to the discontinuity of the self testified to by the anacoluthon and its relation to the structure of the oath, the promise and the Law.
In their discussions, both Hillis Miller and Derrida, quote the passage in Proust's À la recherché du temps perdu in which the narrator describes Albertine's use of anacolutha, and the effect they have:
To tell the truth, I knew nothing that Albertine had done since I had come to know her, or even before. But in her conversation (she might, had I mentioned it to her, have replied that I had misunderstood her) there were certain contradictions, certain embellishments which seemed to me as say: "I remember, the other day, I…," she would suddenly, after a semiquaver rest, change the "I" to "she": it was something that she had witnessed as an innocent spectator, not a thing that she herself had done. It was not she who was the subject of the action [Ce n'était pas elle qui était le sujet de
Albertine's 'abrupt breaches of syntax' consist in anacoluthic moments of hesitation, and subsequent pronominal shift from 'I' to 'she'. Used in order to avoid the disclosure of her infidelity to her lover, Albertine's anacolutha reveal an intimacy between the anacoluthon and the way in which the very idea of fidelity is dependent upon a denial of -and, at the same time, is always potentially compromised by -the discontinuity of the self which Albertine's pronominal shifts exploit. Albertine's anacolutha enable Derrida to delineate the idea that all those ultimate signifiers of fidelity -such as, the oath, the promise, and, the Law -are, in essence, vows to refuse or resist the psychophenomenological truth that we are never the same at any one moment:
This law, and no doubt it is the Law itself, the origin of the Law, is destined to annul precisely temporal difference. The essential destination, the structural signification of the oath or the given word, is to commit oneself not to be affected by time, to remain the same at moment B, whatever may The anacoluthon determines the (im)possibility of the promise: whatever other form it might take, the promise is always, in essence -and therein lies its gravity -a vow to defy the temporal change, rupture and discontinuity the anacoluthon represents; yet, at the same time, that anacoluthic discontinuity itself provides the grounds for the disavowal of any promise, since one can always claim one's non-identity with the promiser one once was: '"I sincerely promised in the past, but time has passed, precisely, passed or surpassed, and the one who promised, long ago or in the past, can remain faithful to his promise, but it is no longer me, I am no longer the same me, I am another, I is another"' (WA, 173-4).
Albertine's anacoluthic dissolution of identity suggests the femininity of Derrida's idea of fidelity -a following that is also a not following -which is key to his concept of inheritance. The anacoluthic is that Other which is integral to, but disavowed by, the masculine ideal of fidelity upon which the Law, the oath, the proper name and the traditional patriarchal lineage depends. As such, there is undoubtedly a connection, Whereas Albertine originates that textual and verbal relationality, Judith has the power to end it, to abort the word, to 'keep' this last word. This seems both a relief -she is the word's 'guardian' -but also a dangerous termination. The transmission of the word falters, and, indeed, ends, in the possession of 'an impassive and at bottom inaccessible woman' (WA, 198) who is, again, wholly external to the male line that has up until now secured its transmission. In '"Le Parjure," Perhaps', the Woman is at once both envied and despised, necessary and evil, essential and excluded. By "the ethics of reading," the reader will remember, I mean the aspect of the act of reading in which there is a response to the text that is both necessitated, in the sense that it is a response to an irresistible demand, and free, in the sense that I must take responsibility for my response and for further effects, In its dictionary definition, anacoluthia is not synonymous with aposiopesis, 'a sudden breaking off in the midst of a sentence'. Wood observes that whereas the aposiopoetic sentence depends upon the absence of its second half, the anacoluthon causes us to reflect on the very impossibility of the aposiopoetic:
Can there be a definitive breaking off or leaving out, without the possibility of some anacoluthic attachment, even if that attachment only operates relationally in terms of negation, for example producing something like [an] 'annihilated feeling'…? 13 In the following section, by continuing to speak after Derrida's death, I enact the anacoluthic attachment of his breaking off. I suggest how the agrammatical continuance of the linguistic definition of "true" anacolutha might provide an interestingly formal model for the event of reading and writing -of thinking -as Derrida understands and practises it. Still, in closing, I cannot but return to the 'annihilated feeling' that remains, despite the unavoidability of continuance, in the wake of Derrida's death.
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Not Following: That we might go on thinking
In 'A Note on the Definition and Description of True Anacolutha' (1988), Nils
Erik Enkvist remarks that 'the term anacoluthon (from Greek an-'not' + akolouthos 'following', hence 'lacking proper sequence') has been used by linguists in senses ranging from the very broad to the very specific'. 15 In the broadest sense, 'anacoluthon' names 'any structure deviating from some standard of well-formedness' (TA, 316), but in this essay Enkvist is concerned to use the term in a more specific sense. He thus defines a 'true anacoluthon' (and we will return to the oddness of this expression in a moment) as 'a blend of two overlapping structures' (TA, 316): 'a true anacoluthon consists of two parts, each of which is syntactically correct in itself, as far as it goes (though it can be subject to hesitation, correction, and melioration)' (TA, 316-7). As
Enkvist continues his explanation, it becomes clear that a "true" anacoluthon does not in fact consists of two parts, but of three -an 'initial structure', a 'final structure', and a 'centre' that functions as 'the overlap string shared by both constructions, the initial and Most interesting in Enkvist's definition of "true" anacolutha is the way in which the centre of the anacoluthon functions as a bridge, as a way of moving from one string, structure, idea or thought, to another that is different from, but (a)grammatically connected to, the first. In this movement, the initial structure is disregarded, but, significantly, 'it may nevertheless go on contributing to the total semantic and pragmatic information of the discourse, particularly if it is not repeated or paraphrased'.
We The centre of the anacoluthon is, indeed, as Derrida has described it, both a rupture and an interruption, but, we now see, it is also a bridge, or, perhaps, a fold, that enables the continuation of thinking and discourse: 'the essential requirement is that the centre must be capable of occurring as an overlap between the initial and the final structures' (TA, 321). This overlap -and the creation of a final text that is agrammatically related to the initial text (that follows and does not follow it) -is the very condition of fidelity. There are, of course, varying degrees of this fidelity. As Enkvist explains, texts X and Z may be 'closely related in form and referent' (TA, 322), but in other instances 'the choice of semantic content for the final periphery can be relatively independent of the initial periphery' (TA, 322). Key to this fidelity, no matter how close the relationship between X and Z, is that Z says at least something new. In reading and writing, in thinking, one has to invent, that is, both disclose and create, if only to respect the alterity of the other:
this word "invention"…hesitates perhaps between creative invention, the production of what is not -or was not earlier -and revelatory invention, the discovery and unveiling of what already is or finds itself to be there Such an invention thus hesitates perhaps, it is suspended undecidably between fiction and truth, but also between lying and veracity, that is, between perjury and fidelity. (WA, 168)
The anacoluthic structure of breach, fold and agrammatical continuance aids thought by providing the means for this inventiveness. The strangeness of Enkvist's attempt to fix "true" anacolutha arises from the term's openness to, and embodiment of, this suspended invention, according to which it operates 'to dissociate, disjoin, interrupt, at the heart of the word [including its own]…at the very inside of language and discourse, as does a trope in general' (WA, 194) . Hence, 'the essential role played by the discreet but decisive intervention of the undecidable that is the "perhaps"' (WA, 168) which Derrida employs above, and which is integral to Hillis Miller's definition of the anacoluthon, and to any definition in general. 'I don't know, perhaps it's a dream, all a dream, that would surprise me, I'll wake, in the silence, and never sleep again, it will be I, or dream, dream again, dream of a silence, a dream silence, full of murmurs, I don't know, that's all words, never wake, all words, there's nothing else, you must go on, that's all I know, they're going to stop, I know that well, I can feel it, they're going to abandon me, it will be the silence, for a moment, a good few moments, or it will be mine, the lasting one, that didn't last, that still lasts, it will be I, you must go on, I can't go on, you must go on, I'll go on, you must say words, as long as there are any, until they find me, until they say me, strange pain,
